Protect against DoS attacks, such as being described in CVE-2010-2632. The changes were derived from what has been committed to NetBSD, with modifications. These are: 1. Preserve the existsing GLOB_LIMIT behaviour by including the number of matches to the set of parameters to limit. 2. Change some of the limits to avoid impacting normal use cases: GLOB_LIMIT_STRING - change from 65536 to ARG_MAX so that glob(3) can still provide a full command line of expanded names. GLOB_LIMIT_STAT - change from 128 to 1024 for no other reason than that 128 feels too low (it's not a limit that impacts the behaviour of the test program listed in CVE-2010-2632). GLOB_LIMIT_PATH - change from 1024 to 65536 so that glob(3) can still provide a fill command line of expanded names. 3. Protect against buffer overruns when we hit the GLOB_LIMIT_STAT or GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR limits. We append SEP and EOS to pathend in those cases. Return GLOB_ABORTED instead of GLOB_NOSPACE when we would otherwise overrun the buffer. This change also modifies the existing behaviour of glob(3) in case GLOB_LIMIT is specifies by limiting the *new* matches and not all matches. This is an important distinction when GLOB_APPEND is set or when the caller uses a non-zero gl_offs. Previously pre-existing matches or the value of gl_offs would be counted in the number of matches even though the man page states that glob(3) would return GLOB_NOSPACE when gl_matchc or more matches were found. The limits that cannot be circumvented are GLOB_LIMIT_STRING and GLOB_LIMIT_PATH all others can be crossed by simply calling glob(3) again and with GLOB_APPEND set. The entire description above applies only when GLOB_LIMIT has been specified of course. No limits apply when this flag isn't set! Obtained from: Juniper Networks, Inc