Errata
Verified (1)
RFC 5705 inline-errata
Source of RFC: tls (sec)
Updated by: RFC8446, RFC8447, RFC9846
Errata-ID: 4395
- Status:
- Verified
- Type:
- Technical
- Reported By:
- Rick van Rein
- Date Reported:
- 2015-06-16
- Verified by:
- Deb Cooley
- Date Verified:
- 2026-10-12
Section 4 says:
If no context is provided, it then computes:
PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, label,
SecurityParameters.client_random +
SecurityParameters.server_random
)[length]
If context is provided, it computes:
PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, label,
SecurityParameters.client_random +
SecurityParameters.server_random +
context_value_length + context_value
)[length]
It should say:
If no context is provided, it then computes:
PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, label,
SecurityParameters.client_random +
SecurityParameters.server_random
)[0..length-1]
If context is provided, it computes:
PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret, label,
SecurityParameters.client_random +
SecurityParameters.server_random +
context_value_length + context_value
)[0..length-1]
Notes:
The current notation is not in line with that of RFC 5246, where the [0..N-1] notation is used on a PRF outcome in Sections 7.4.9 and 8.1 and similar [A..B] notation is also used elsewhere. This makes me believe that the current text is technically wrong, and not in line with the intentions stated informally below it,
The output is a pseudorandom bit string of length bytes generated
from the master_secret.