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Telechat Review of draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp-12
review-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp-12-secdir-telechat-hallam-baker-2026-02-09-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 12)
Type Telechat Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2026-02-17
Requested 2026-01-30
Authors Jon Peterson , Sean Turner
I-D last updated 2026-01-30 (Latest revision 2025-11-04)
Completed reviews Genart IETF Last Call review of -11 by Vijay K. Gurbani (diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -11 by Phillip Hallam-Baker (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -12 by Phillip Hallam-Baker
Assignment Reviewer Phillip Hallam-Baker
State Completed
Request Telechat review on draft-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/TkfjsTal6DklO6Y4Zk1NsRtmDKQ
Reviewed revision 12
Result Ready
Completed 2026-02-09
review-ietf-stir-certificates-ocsp-12-secdir-telechat-hallam-baker-2026-02-09-00
OCSP is a well established protocol with properties that are well understood,
the authors know it well. There are thus likely to be few surprises applying it
to an application.

The document appropriately directs the reader to the well known privacy
concerns of using OCSP - the party providing the responder has a source for
traffic analysis.

One possible area that might deserve greater attention is the case where the
OCSP responder is operated by an entirely separate party to the CA. For
example, in a Lawful Intercept system.

Another possibility might be worth mentioning is that given that we expect to
be using ECDH as the signature algorithm, rather than pre-generating actual
signatures, a responder can pregenerate signing pairs {x, x.P}, then apply them
to generating signature as needed.