

On Solving Challenges in the KECCAK Crunchy Crypto Contest

- Xiaoen Lin¹, Zhengrong Lu¹, Yantian Shen¹, Chongxu Ren¹, Hongbo Yu^{1,2,3*}
- ¹Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
- ²Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, China
- 3State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Contents

- Background
 - KECCAK
 - Crunchy Contest
- Some Results
 - KECCAK[r = 640, c = 160, $n_r = 4$]
 - Based on (non) linear structures (complexity around 2^{61})
 - KECCAK[r = 40, c = 160, $n_r = 2$]
 - Based on (non) linear structures (complexity around 2^{63})
 - Based on linear structures and symmetries (complexity around 2⁴⁹)
 - KECCAK[r = 240, c = 160, $n_r = 4$]
 - Based on internal differential cryptanalysis (complexity around 2^{59})
 - KECCAK[r = 640, c = 160, $n_r = 5$] (unsolved yet)
 - Based on internal differential cryptanalysis (complexity around 2⁶²)





The Sunway TaihuLight supercomputer

Background

KECCAK

- Sponge construction
- Operate on a state of b = r + c bits.
 - The state can be described as 5×5 w-bit lanes.
- Keccak-f permutation
 - Consist of $12 + 2log_2(w)$ rounds.
 - 5 steps for each round.








Figure 2: The Keccak-f state [BDH+b].

$$\theta: A_{x,y,z} = A_{x,y,z} \oplus \bigoplus_{i=0 \sim 4} (A_{x-1,i,z} \oplus A_{x+1,i,z-1})$$

$$\rho: A_{x,y,z} = A_{x,y,(z-r_{x,y})}$$

$$\pi: A_{x,y,z} = A_{x+3y,x,z}$$

$$\chi: A_{x,y,z} = A_{x,y,z} \oplus (A_{x+1,y,z} \oplus 1) \cdot A_{x+2,y,z}$$

$$\iota: A_{0,0,z} = A_{0,0,z} \oplus RC_z$$

- The Keccak Crunchy Crypto Collision and Pre-image Contest
 - *b* is in {200, 400, 800, 1600}.
 - c = 160 (output size is 80-bit for pre-image)


- Related previous techniques
 - linear structure [GLS16]
 - Maintain linear expressions of initial variables through rounds.
 - Enable pre-image recovery via solving linear systems repeatedly.
 - allocating approach [LS19]
 - Apply better linear structure.
 - Use two-block model with trade-off.
 - (non)linear structure [Raj19, LIMY21, WWF+21]
 - Allow quadratic bits in linear structure.
 - Solve quadratic equation systems.
 - zero coefficient [HLY21]
 - Determine column sums carefully.
 - Obtain more linear dependent bit-pairs.
 - and so on ……

Overview

Why select these 10 lanes. Why use these specific values for the column sums.

- Select 10 lanes on θ^1 as variables.
- Backward:
 - $[x, x, 1, x + y, 0] \stackrel{\chi^{-1}}{\leftarrow} [1, x, 1, y, 0]$
 - Starting state is still linear.
 - Add equations to match capacity part.
- Forward:
 - Add equations to control column sums on θ^1 .
 - Add equations to restrict some linear bits on X^2 constant bits.
 - Some bits on θ^3 will be linearized so that some bits on X^3 will become linear.
 - Add equations to promote the probability of matching the digest.

How to determine the bits and equations for linearization?



- Why selecting these 10 lanes on θ^1 as variables?
 - There are 5 choices.
















- Previous attacks on round-reduced KECCAK-224/256 select the first type.
 - Many extra matching gains





• Only 2^1 (for padding) extra matching gains for KECCAK[r=640, c=160].



- Different choices affect the distribution of linear/constant bits on θ^2 .
 - Select the best choice for subsequent linearization according to given digest.


- The specific column sums on θ^1
 - The property for θ operation
 - $a \oplus b = const = d \oplus e$
 - $a \oplus c = const = d \oplus f$





- When restrict d a constant bit, e and f will be constant simultaneously.
 - Try to make constant bits on θ^2 as many as possible.
- Use specific column sums on θ^1 so that there are 3 constant bits for most rows on θ^2 .
 - $[x, 0, y, 0, 1] \xrightarrow{\chi} [x + y, 0, y + 1, 0, 1]$
 - Accordingly, there are 3 constant bits for most columns on θ^2
- Restrict less bits on X^2 and linearize more bits on θ^3 .

$$KECCAK[r = 640, c = 160, n_r = 4]$$




- How to determine the strategy of linearizing the last two rounds?
 - The linearization
 - Remain 320 63 1 158 = 98 degrees of freedom on X^2 .
 - 63 for column sums on θ^1 (-1 because inherent linear dependence)
 - 1 for padding rule
 - 158 for matching starting state (-1 because inherent linear dependence, another -1 because two capacity candidates)
 - Spend some to restrict some linear bits on X^2 constant bits.
 - Every equation can restrict three bits on X^2 constant bits.
 - Some bits on X^3 can be linearized.
 - Every constant bit on X^2 will linearize two bits on θ^3 .
 - Every specific 11 linearized bits on θ^3 will linearize a bit on X^3 .
 - Equations can be added on X^3 to promote probability of digest matching.
 - Precompute a table of optimal matching probabilities under various conditions.
 - MILP model.


- Details of MILP model (first part, linearize last two rounds)
 - Use 800 + 800 + 160 = 1760 Boolean variables.
 - Whether add an equation on $X_{x,y,z}^2$.
 - Whether the bit $\theta_{x,y,z}^3$ is linearized.
 - Whether the bit $X_{x,0,z}^3$ is linearized.
 - Add 800 equations for θ^3 .
 - For example, $a_{\Theta_{4,0,0}^3} \le a_{X_{0,0,0}^2} + a_{X_{1,0,0}^2} + a_{X_{4,2,18}^2} + a_{X_{3,4,9}^2} + a_{X_{3,1,1}^2} + a_{X_{2,3,30}^2}$ means: $\theta_{4,0,0}^3$ will be linearized when an equation is added to restrict any of these six bits on X^2 .
 - Add $11 \times 160 = 1760$ equations for X^3 .

. means: $X_{0,0,0}^3$ will be linearized when the 11

- Details of MILP model (second part, modeling an S-box (a row))
 - Use $32 \times 5 = 160$ Boolean variables (for z^{th} row).
 - Transform to 32 cases. For example:
 - Case $22 = (10110)_2$ means 2^{nd} , 3^{rd} , and 5^{th} bits are linearized.
 - 5 variables for each case.
 - The first k variables are 1 means adding (k-1) equations.
 - Add an equation: $\Sigma_{i=0\sim31}a_{i,0}^z\leq1$
 - The linearization circumstance must belong to only one case.
 - For each case (32 cases in total):
 - Add at most 5 equations (Case $22=(10110)_2$ for example): $a_{22,0}^z \le a_{X_{1,0,z}^3} = a_{22,0}^z \le a_{X_{2,0,z}^3} = a_{X_{2,0,z}^$
 - May belong to case 22 when the three bits on X^3 are all linearized. $a_{22,0}^z \le a_{X_{4,0,z}^3}$
 - Add 4 equations: $a_{i,1}^z \le a_{i,0}^z$ $a_{i,2}^z \le a_{i,1}^z$ $a_{i,3}^z \le a_{i,2}^z$ $a_{i,4}^z \le a_{i,3}^z$
 - The restrictions will be added one by one.




- Details of MILP model (third part, global constraint and objective)
 - Add an equation: $(\Sigma_{x=0\sim 4,y=0\sim 4,z=0\sim 31}a_{X^2_{x,y,z}}) + (\Sigma_{i=0\sim 31,j=0\sim 4,z=0\sim 31}a^z_{i,j}) + 8 \le 98$
 - The number of used degrees of freedom is limited by 98.
 - Leave around 7 degrees of freedom because quadratic equation system with 34 equations on 7 variables can be solved linearly.
 - Leaving one more degree of freedom does not affect the result of MILP model while it speeds up the solving time.
 - The objective: $Maximizing: \Sigma_{z=0\sim 31, i=0\sim 31, j=1\sim 4}(log_2(p_{z,i,j}/p_{z,i,j-1})\times a_{i,j}^z)$
 - The gain (probability calculated by log_2) of adding one more equation (when $a_{i,j}^z=1$).
 - $p_{z,i,j}$ is a precomputed table recording the best probability under following conditions:
 - z^{th} row
 - i^{th} case of linearization (which bits on X^3 are linearized and can be controlled)
 - *j* added equations




- Complexity
 - There are 320 variables on θ^1 .
 - Add 158 equations to match one of capacity parts. One more for padding.
 - Add 63 equations to control column sums on θ^1 .
 - Add 71 equations to restrict some linear bits on X^2 constant bits.
 - 19 bits on X^3 will become linear.
 - Add 19 equations to promote the probability of matching the digest.
 - Bring gains of $\sim 2^{16.5}$.
 - Solve quadratic equation systems with 34 quadratic equations on 8 variables.
 - Try $\sim 2^{56.5}$ different guesses for 71 equations on X^2 .
 - It is expected to have one solution.


- First method (earlier attempt)
 - By solving quadratic equation systems.
 - Reduce the number of quadratic terms.
 - Although the complexity is relatively high, it is independent of round constants.
- Second method
 - Based on combination of linear structures and symmetries.
 - Round constant is zero for ir = 3.
 - Solve in backward direction.




- Overview of the first method
 - Solve the first 40-bit.
 - Let the remaining 40-bit digest matched randomly.
- Use quadratic structure and solve equation systems
 - Leave as many degrees of freedom as possible.
 - Produce as few quadratic terms as possible.



- The quadratic structure
 - $5 \times 8 1 = 39$ variables on θ^0
 - $2 \times 8 = 16$ equations restricting column sums
 - Rest 23 degrees of freedom.
 - 40 equations for (first 40-bit) digest matching
 - 8 linear equations, and 32 quadratic equations
 - Guess four more bits to solve the quadratic equation system linearly.
 - Rest around 19 degrees of freedom, and require guessing around 2^{21} times for matching the first 40-bit digest.
 - Randomly match the rest 40-bit digest.



 $4 \times 8 = 32$ different quadratic terms



Randomly matched




2 rounds


symmetric

- Overview of the second method
 - Use linear structure produce the last block:
 - Capacity part of starting state is symmetric.
 - Match the first 40-bit digest with 1 probability.
 - Repeat 2⁴⁰ times, and match the whole digest.




Match the all zero IV.







- Get the last message block
 - $25 \times 8 = 200$ variables on Θ^0



- Each lane on the capacity part of Θ^0 is symmetric (e.g. 0x11).
 - Add $20 \times 4 = 80$ equations.
- The bits on 2^{nd} , 4^{th} , and 5^{th} planes of P^0 are constant bits.
 - Add $15 \times 8 = 120$ equations.
- Match the first 40-bit digest on Θ^2 .
 - Add 40 equations.
- 41 equations among them are linear-dependent.
 - The number of degrees of freedom is enough.
- Try different constant settings on P^0 , until the last 40-bit digest satisfied.




- The backward process
 - Start from a symmetric capacity.



- Select different message blocks, so that the state is symmetric before inverse ι.
- For the property of $\theta^{-1} \circ \rho^{-1} \circ \pi^{-1} \circ \chi^{-1}$ operations, state stays symmetric.
- Select the start round index ir = 3, where the round constant is zero for the first round ($rc^{ir=3} = 0$). The property of symmetry will always hold.
- The property of symmetry may be better and better.
 - period i = 4 to period i = 2 to period i = 1 to all 0 (e.g. $0x11 \rightarrow 0xaa \rightarrow 0xff \rightarrow 0x00$).


```
ff 00 00 00 00 00 p = 2^{-20} 00 ff ff 00 de aa aa 00 00 aa p = 2^{-40} 33 66 ee 88 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff 00 ff p = 2^{-20} 00 ff ff 00 00 aa 00 33 ff cc 99 dd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff aa 00 55 55 55 bb 66 55 88 dd
```

- Overview
 - The first stage
 - Use the target internal difference algorithm (TIDA) based on previous work [DDS13, ZHL23, ZHL24].
 - From constant starting state, produce around 2^{32} states with symmetric capacity part.
 - The second stage
 - Use a new technique based on internal differential cryptanalysis.
 - Produce around 2^{49} states with symmetric capacity part and match the digest.
 - The symmetric states produced by two stages all lie within a set of size 2^{80} .
 - With time-memory trade-off, find collisions between two sets produced by two stages.





 $(0001\ 0010\ 0011\ 0100)_2$

- Preliminary concepts
 - Internal difference
 - Period *i*
 - Symmetric state (each lane consists of w/i repetitions of i-bit segments)
 - Internal difference of a state (*XOR* the segments for each lane)
 - For example, let lane size w = 16, period i = 4, then consider the actual value of a lane 0x1234.
 - The internal difference of this lane will be 0x0325.
 - Given internal difference of state A, internal difference of $\theta(A)$, $\rho(A)$, $\pi(A)$, and $\iota(A)$ can be directly derived with 1 probability. However, internal difference of $\chi(A)$ may propagate to different cases according to the actual value, unless A is a symmetric state.
 - Internal differential characteristic
 - Exhibits the internal difference propagating through a few rounds.
 - Contains a holding probability for χ operation of each round.
 - The characteristics also hold in a reversed direction because the operations are invertible.




- The first stage
 - 2.5-round internal differential characteristic
 - Period i = 8 (half of lane size w = 16).
 - Leads to symmetric (all zero internal difference) capacity part.
 - Holding probability $2^{-10-11} = 2^{-21}$.
 - TIDA [DDS13, ZHL23, ZHL24]
 - Linking constant starting state and fix internal difference on Θ^1 .
 - Difference phase
 - Prepare an equation system describe internal difference on first round.
 - Add equations restricting internal difference on capacity part.
 - Select an affine subset for internal difference of each row on X^1 , and add equations.
 - Value phase
 - Enumerate every solution of equation system in the difference phase.
 - Prepare another equation system describe actual value on first round.
 - Add equations restricting actual value on capacity part.
 - Select an affine subset for actual value of each row on X¹, and add equations.
 - Enumerate every solution of equation system in the value phase.
 - Check whether 2.5-round internal differential characteristic is passed or not.







- The second stage (overview)
 - Determine a 1.5-round inversed internal differential characteristic $(X^1 \to \Theta^0)$.
 - Guess different internal difference after the χ operation.
 - Derive the linear strategy for the χ^{-1} operation.
 - After 1.5-round, add linear restrictions on internal difference.
 - Linearize some other bits (actual value).
 - The strategy is determined by MILP model.
 - Let the rest bits satisfied randomly.
 - Compute backward and get starting state.




The second stage



- Deal with χ in the second round.
 - Internal difference of X^1 is known according to internal differential characteristic.
 - For each row, guess possible internal difference on I^1 .
 - Then determine the actual value.
 - The variables are selected on I^1 .
 - Add equations on these variables so that the restricted actual values ensure that internal difference of each row can be transformed backward to X^1 with 1 probability.
 - For non-active S-box (all zero row), no equations are required.
 - For each row with DDT = 8, 3 equations are required (there are two kinds of 3 equations).
 - For each row with DDT = 4, 3 equations are required.
 - For each row with DDT = 2, 4 equations are required (there is no row with DDT = 2 here).
 - Degrees of freedom
 - There are 9 active rows → using 27 degrees of freedom



- The second stage
 - linear restrictions on internal difference after 1.5 rounds
 - The state I^1 : the internal difference is fixed constant, and the actual value is all linear.
 - For each lane: high i=8 bits are variables, while the remaining w-i=8 bits either exactly match these variable bits or differ by a constant 1.
 - After ι , θ , ρ , and π , the internal difference is still constant and the actual value is still linear.
 - After χ , the internal difference will be linear although the actual value becomes quadratic.
 - Suppose three consecutive bits on two corresponding rows are x, y, z and $x \oplus c_x, y \oplus c_y, z \oplus c_z$.
 - After χ , the first bits on two rows will be $x \oplus z \oplus yz$ and $(x \oplus c_x) \oplus (z \oplus c_z) \oplus (y \oplus c_y)(z \oplus c_z)$.
 - Although the two bits are both quadratic, the difference $(c_x \oplus c_z \oplus c_z y \oplus c_y z \oplus c_y c_z)$ is linear.
 - After ι and θ , ρ , π of next round, the internal difference is still linear.
 - Add restrictions so that the digest is matched when high i bits on each lane were matched.



- The second stage
 - Linearize some other bits
 - Use MILP model, and similar to cryptanalysis on b = 800.
 - Spend 87 + 31 = 118 degrees of freedom restrict 31 more bits on X^3 .
 - Complexity
 - There are 400 degrees of freedom on I¹.
 - 200 equations are added to restrict the internal difference on I¹.
 - 27 equations are added to restrict the internal difference on X^1 (restrict the actual value for 9 active rows).

1.5 rounds


- 40 equations are added to restrict the internal difference on X^3 .
- 87 equations are added to restrict some bits on X^2 constant bits.
- 31 equations are added to restrict the corresponding required bits on X^3 .
- Solve linear equation system and verify the around $2^{400-200-27-40-87-31}=2^{15}$ solutions.
- For one try, the probability of matching the digest will be $2^{-(80-40-31)} = 2^{-9}$.
- Collect around 2^{49} symmetric starting states that also lead to required digest.


- Unsolved yet (the complexity is around 2^{62})
- Differences from cryptanalysis on 4-round b=400
 - Increasing the round number leads to the difficulty of the first stage.
 - Instead, cancel the first stage and exploit the symmetry property of all zero IV.
 - Without MitM, higher symmetry is required to reduce the complexity.
 - We select period i = 8 (w = 32, and 4 repetitions for each lane).
 - Other modifications such as characteristic, linearization and so on.


second stage




First stage








first stage



- From given digest, generate some applicable starting states with symmetric capacity part.
- Second stage
 - Generate a large number of directed edge from a symmetric capacity part to another.
 - The pre-image can be found when the node representing the all zero IV becomes connected to any node in digest-attainable set.




- The first stage
 - Almost the same with the second stage.
 - Only difference:
 - When matching digest, restrictions are on the first plane instead of the last plane.

2.5 rounds


internal

difference

The number of restrictions are fewer.



the second stage



the first stage

ιοχ

restrict

linear

internal

difference

1.5 rounds


internal

difference

enumeraté

||``\linearize

- The second stage
 - Find the characteristic.




- The probability of passing χ operations can not be too low.
 - The probability should be at least 2^{-20} .
 - The sum of numbers of active rows for first two χ should be less than 10.
- Require more non-active rows on X² due to insufficient degrees of freedom.
 - The number of degrees of freedom used for linearization of the third χ should be less than 80.
- There is no difference bit on the last plane of the starting state.
 - The capacity part should be symmetric.
- We employ condition-guided search instead of using the MILP model.
 - The MILP model with basic implementation does not provide desired characteristic quickly.
 - We believe the MILP model with better modeling can also find the good characteristic.

• The second stage

$$\Theta^0 \overset{\theta^{-1} \circ \rho^{-1} \circ \pi^{-1}}{\longleftarrow} X^0 \overset{\chi^{-1}}{\longleftarrow} I^0 \overset{\iota^{-1}}{\longleftarrow} \Theta^1 \overset{\pi \circ \rho \circ \theta}{\longrightarrow} X^1 \overset{\chi}{\rightarrow} I^1 \overset{\iota}{\rightarrow} \Theta^2 \overset{\pi \circ \rho \circ \theta}{\longrightarrow} X^2$$

- The way of searching characteristic:
 - Determine a start round index (ir = 5 shows the best result).
 - Enumerate three or four bit-pairs on Θ^1 (even parity for each column).
 - First prune:
 - Some bits on I^0 should be cancelled out by the first-round constant $(I^0 \stackrel{\iota^{-1}}{\leftarrow} \Theta^1)$.
 - Second prune:
 - Assume the second χ ($X^1 \xrightarrow{\chi} I^1$) can extend any additional bits on each active row.
 - Then, for the most ideal case with as many even-parity columns as possible on Θ^2 , the number of required degrees of freedom on X^2 should not exceed the limit.
 - Third prune:
 - Assume the first χ^{-1} ($X^0 \stackrel{\chi^{-1}}{\longleftarrow} I^0$) can extend any additional bits on each active row.
 - Then, for the most ideal case, all the columns on X^0 should be even-parity columns.
 - For the rare cases after pruning, enumerate all the possible propagations for each χ , and check whether the characteristic meet the requirements.

- The second stage
 - Deal with χ in the third round.




- For more complex characteristic and different ratio $(\frac{w}{i} = 4)$ of lane size w and period i, the linearization is similar but with minor differences.
- We should consider four rows at the same time (with stride i = 8).
 - If there is no active row:
 - No equations are required.
 - If there is only one active row:
 - For the case of DDT = 8, 3 equations are required (there are two kinds of 3 equations).
 - Or 2 (or 1) equations with 0.75(or 0.5) probability.
 - For the case of DDT = 4, 3 equations are required.
 - For the case of DDT = 2, 4 equations are required.
 - If there are at least two active rows:
 - Enumerate all the 32 cases for actual value, and record the cases that satisfy the propagation for the four rows at the same time.
 - If there are two available cases, 4 equations are required.
 - If there is only one available case, 5 equations are required to fully determine the actual value.

• The second stage (supplements)

|--8-8-8-|-----|

- The internal differential characteristic for the second stage.
 - Require 72 equations to restrict the χ in the third round (72 + 120 < 200).
 - Probability of passing the first two rounds is $2^{-(8+12)} = 2^{-20}$ (require $\sim 2^{41}$ states).



|----4--|------|

References

- [BDPA11] Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michaël Peeters, and Gilles Van Assche. Crypto-graphic sponge functions, 2011. http://sponge.noekeon.org/CSF-0.1.pdf.
- [BDH+] Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Seth Hoffert, Michaël Peeters, Gilles Van Assche, and Ronny Van Keer. The keccak-f state. https://keccak.team/figures.html.
- [GLS16] Jian Guo, Meicheng Liu, and Ling Song. Linear structures: Applications to cryptanalysis of round-reduced Keccak. In Jung Hee Cheon and Tsuyoshi Takagi, editors, ASIACRYPT 2016, Part I, volume 10031 of LNCS, pages249–274. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, December 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53887-6_9.
- [LS19] Ting Li and Yao Sun. Preimage attacks on round-reduced Keccak-224/256via an allocating approach. In Yuval Ishai and Vincent Rijmen, editors, EUROCRYPT 2019, Part III, volume 11478 of LNCS, pages 556–584. Springer, Cham, May 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17659-4_19.
- [Raj19] Mahesh Sreekumar Rajasree. Cryptanalysis of round-reduced KECCAK using non-linear structures. In Feng Hao, Sushmita Ruj, and Sourav Sen Gupta, editors, INDOCRYPT 2019, volume 11898 of LNCS, pages 175–192. Springer, Cham, December 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35423-7_9.
- [LIMY21] Fukang Liu, Takanori Isobe, Willi Meier, and Zhonghao Yang. Algebraic attacks on round-reduced Keccak. In Joonsang Baek and Sushmita Ruj, editors, ACISP 21, volume 13083 of LNCS, pages 91–110. Springer, Cham, December 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90567-5_5.
- [WWF+21] Congming Wei, Chenhao Wu, Ximing Fu, Xiaoyang Dong, Kai He, JueHong, and Xiaoyun Wang. Preimage attacks on 4-round keccak by solving multivariate quadratic systems. In Jong Hwan Park and Seung-Hyun Seo, editors, ICISC 21, volume 13218 of LNCS, pages 195–216. Springer, Cham, December 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08896-4_10.
- [HLY21] Le He, Xiaoen Lin, and Hongbo Yu. Improved preimage attacks on 4-roundKeccak-224/256.IACR Trans. Symm. Cryptol., 2021(1):217–238, 2021. https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2021.i1.217-238.
- [DDS13] Dinur, I., Dunkelman, O., Shamir, A.: Collision Attacks on Up to 5 Rounds of SHA-3 Using Generalized Internal Differentials. In: Moriai, S. (eds) Fast Software Encryption. FSE 2013, LNCS vol. 8424, pp. 219–240. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3_12
- [ZHL23] Zhang, Z., Hou, C., Liu, M.: Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced SHA-3 Using Conditional Internal Differentials. In: Hazay, C., Stam, M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 2023, LNCS vol 14007, pp. 220–251. Springer, Cham (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30634-1_8
- [ZHL24] Zhang, Z., Hou, C., Liu, M.: Probabilistic Linearization: Internal Differential Collisions in up to 6 Rounds of SHA-3. In: Reyzin, L., Stebila, D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 2024, LNCS, vol 14923, pp. 241–272. Springer, Cham (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68385-5_8

